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ABSTRACT 
 
Using data drawn from a survey conducted shortly after the 2002 elections, we 
investigate the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) election victory from the 
perspective of inter-party vote movements.  Our aim is not only to identify the parties 
from which the AKP votes originated, but also the segments of these parties' voter bases 
the party appealed to in particular.  Descriptive statistics suggest that almost all of the 
voters who had voted for the pro-Islamist party in 1999, about half of those who 
supported the center-right and the ultra-nationalist parties, and one-fifth to two fifth of the 
supporters of the center-left parties were captured by the AKP.  Given that the actual vote 
share of the party was 34.3 percent, we interpret these figures as evidence of further voter 
realignment after the election.  Our econometric work reveals that confidence in the 
economic performance of the party was a leading factor in the election outcome.  For the 
voters attracted from the left-of-center parties, ideological factors also played an 
important role, whereas in the case of voters transferred from the far-right pro-Islamist 
and ultra-nationalist parties, it was the demographic factors.  For the voters coming from 
the center-right, both sets of variables were important. 
 
 
Keywords: Turkey, elections, party choice, voter behavior, logit estimation.
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1. Introduction  
 
In the November 3, 2002 Turkish parliamentary election, more than half of the 
voters cast their ballots for a party different than the one they chose in the previous 
election held on April 18, 1999.  None of the parties which entered the parliament in 
1999 were able to do so in 2002, failing to surpass the ten percent national threshold 
required to be represented in the Turkish Grand National Assembly.  The aggregate vote 
share of the three incumbent parties, the Democratic Left Party (DSP), the Nationalist 
Action Party (MHP) and the Motherland Party (ANAP), dropped to 14.7 percent from 
53.4 percent.  In addition to the voters which deserted the incumbent parties, 2.5 percent 
of the voters left the True Path Party (DYP), one of the opposition parties.  Furthermore, 
the dissolution of the main opposition Virtue Party (FP) by the Turkish Constitutional 
Court on June 22, 2001 for engaging in anti-secular activities, forced 15.4 percent of the 
electorate which voted for this party in 1999, to make another choice in 2002.      
 
The voters who migrated from the political parties mentioned above moved 
essentially to one of the following three parties: the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP), the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Young Party (GP), with the former 
receiving the lion’s share.  The Justice and Development Party (AKP), one of the two 
parties which emerged from the banned Virtue Party (FP), on 14 August 2001, only 15 
months before the election, received 34.3 percent of the votes and captured almost two-
thirds of the parliamentary seats.  Its proportion of the vote was more than twice that of 
the Virtue party (FP) in 1999, indicating that it attracted votes from other parties as well.  
The party raised its vote share to 46.6 percent in 2007 and continues to rule in a single-
party government.  The Felicity Party (SP), the other party with roots in the Virtue Party 
(FP) however, received only 2.5 percent of the vote in 2002 and 2.3 percent in 2007, 
perhaps due to towing the anti-Western, anti-EU and pro-Islamist line of the old Virtue 
Party (FP), unlike its rival Justice and Development Party (AKP), which disavowed it.1   
 
Although it is obvious that the voters lost by the Democratic Left Party (DSP), the 
Nationalist Action Party (MHP), the Motherland Party (ANAP), the Virtue Party (FP) 
and the True Path Party (DYP), essentially ended up in the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP), the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Young Party (GP), it is not 
clear how these voters were distributed among the latter three parties, and which socio-
economic and ideological segments of these voters were captured by each of the latter 
parties.  There are very few quantitative studies on this area and most of these rely on 
simple statistical methods.  For example, Nuhrat (2002), Erdem (2002a and 2002b) and 
Turan (2004) utilize only descriptive statistics in their analysis of pre-election surveys, 
whereas Esmer (2002a and 2002b) conduct similar analyses using post-election surveys.  
Tosun (2003) and Tüzün (2007) compare the outcomes of the 1999 and 2002 elections at 
the province and district levels, respectively, basing their conclusions regarding inter-
party vote shifts on simple correlations between the 1999 vote shares of losing parties 
with the 2002 vote shares of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the 
Republican People’s Party (CHP).  The only study to use a rigorous statistical procedure 
to estimate vote movements between various parties is Akarca (2008).  His method 
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involves the estimation of the vote movement between any two parties, controlling for all 
other inter-party vote shifts.  He also includes several socio-economic variables in his 
model, but with province level election data, he is unable to examine the potential impact 
of the socio-demographic characteristics of individuals. 
 
In the present study, we intend to determine the sources of the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) votes in 2002 using micro data which will enable us to 
consider voter characteristics in detail.  For this purpose, we will utilize data drawn from 
a survey conducted shortly after the 2002 election, in which participants were questioned 
about their votes in both 1999 and 2002.  The data in question also contains information 
about the socio-demographic characteristics of the participants and their ideological and 
religious tendencies.  Our aim is to identify not only the parties from which the Justice 
and Development Party (AKP) votes have originated, but also the segments of these 
parties’ voter bases the Justice and Development Party (AKP) was able to attract in 
particular.  In the next section, we present descriptive statistics pertaining to our data and 
discuss the insights they provide.  In Section 3, we present the results of the logit 
regressions which express a voter’s tendency to vote for the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) in 2002 as a function of his/her party preference in 1999, socio-demographic 
and ideological characteristics, and confidence in regards to the future of the economy. 
This method allows us to measure vote shifts to the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) from each of the other parties together in a single equation, rather than one-at-a-
time as is the case with most of the previous studies.  Finally, to determine which 
segments of the voter bases of other parties Justice and Development Party (AKP) has 
attracted, we estimate a more comprehensive model in which the interactions between the 
voter’s 1999 party choice and his/her other characteristics are included as explanatory 
variables.  To the best of our knowledge, the latter issue has not been examined 
empirically in any study.   
 
Determining the origins and characteristics of the voters who have migrated to the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) will enable us to bring out the coalition upon 
which the party is based.  This in turn should help analysts gauge the stability of the party 
(and thus the government), and understand the rationale behind the positions it takes.  It 
should be noted, however, that tying the inter-party vote transfers to specific events or 
historical trends and developments, although very important, is beyond the scope of the 
present study.  Some of the studies which address these are Çarkoğlu (2002), Çağaptay 
(2002), Açıkel (2003), Özel (2003), Öniş and Keyman (2003), Bacik (2004), Atacan 
(2005), Tepe (2005), Öniş (2006), Akarca and Tansel (2006), Özbudun (2006a and 
2006b), Kalaycıoğlu (2007), Sayarı (2007), Taşpınar (2007), and Yıldırım, İnaç and 
Özler (2007).   
 
 
2. The data and descriptive statistics 
 
 The survey which generated our data was conducted during the December 21-27, 
2002 period by Social Research Center (SAM), a private research and consulting firm, 
under the direction of Cenap Nuhrat.  It employed a multi-stage stratified random 
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sampling method to create a sample representative of the Turkish electorate.  The 1207 
individuals in the resulting sample came from 25 of the 81 provinces in Turkey.  These 
were scattered throughout the country and include the following provinces: Antalya, İçel, 
Maraş, Isparta, Kars, Malatya, Elazığ, İzmir, Afyon, Kütahya, Manisa, Gaziantep, 
Batman, Siirt, Ankara, Eskişehir, Konya, Amasya, Giresun, Zonguldak, Çorum, İstanbul, 
Kocaeli, Bursa, and Edirne.  While 24 percent of the respondents were residents of the 
metropolitan areas of Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, 40 percent of them came from other 
urban areas and the remaining 36 percent from rural regions.  In estimating our 
regressions however, we were able to use only 1080 of the observations.  First of all, we 
eliminated from the sample, all 59 observations from Siirt and Batman provinces in the 
southeastern region.  The behavior of voters in this region is considerably different than 
in the rest of the country and is largely ethnically driven.2  We also had to exclude 
observations for which some of the explanatory variables were missing and those 
involving respondents who were too young to vote at the time of the 2002 election.  This 
resulted in the elimination of 68 other observations spread among the other provinces in 
the sample.  The 152 individuals who reported not voting in 2002 and 45 who declined to 
reveal their vote were not excluded from the sample.  Some of these individuals may be 
supporters of the Justice and Development Party (AKP).  However, their support 
apparently is not strong enough to induce them to cast their ballot or own it afterwards.  
So we treated them as a separate category similar to the way we treated the voters who 
voted for other parties.  
 
 The breakdown of the sample according to the parties respondents have voted for in 
the 1999 election, and the proportion of the votes the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) has received in 2002 from each group, is presented in Table 1.  The parties listed 
in the table account for 90 percent of the valid votes cast in the 1999 election.  The 
Kurdish-nationalist, Democratic People’s Party (DEHAP), which received 6.2 percent of 
the votes in 1999 was included in the “other parties” category, as none of its 1999 voters 
in the sample switched to AKP in 2002.  The impression obtained from the table is that 
the Justice and Development Party (AKP) captured slightly more than half of the voters 
who had voted for the center-right Motherland and True Path parties (ANAP and DYP) in 
1999, almost all of the voters of far-right Islamist, Virtue Party (FP), and about half of the 
voters who casted their ballots for the far-right nationalist, Nationalist Action Party 
(MHP).  On the other hand, the party received a negligible amount of the center-left votes 
that had gone to the Republican People’s Party (CHP) in 1999.   
 
 The definitions and sample means of the explanatory variables to be utilized in the 
econometric work are given in Table 2, for the entire sample and for the subsamples of 
those who did and did not vote for the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002.  
The subsample means imply that, compared to the supporters of other parties, the 
supporters of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) are older, more religious, further 
to the right in the ideological spectrum, and more optimistic about the future of the 
economy.  The party is also more popular among females and those with less schooling.  
The subsample means reveal also that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
supporters are poorer than the supporters of other parties.  However we have not included 
Income as an explanatory variable in our analysis because it turned out to be highly 
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correlated with the years of education and failed to contribute significantly to regressions 
which included the schooling variable.   
 
 The mean values of the party dummies imply that the former Democratic Left Party 
(DSP) voters constituted 13 percent of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) voters 
in 2002, the former Nationalist Action Party (MHP) voters 18 percent, the former 
Motherland Party (ANAP) voters 14 percent, the former True Path Party (DYP) voters 12 
percent, the former Virtue Party (FP) voters 21 percent, and the former Republican 
People’s Party (CHP) voters 4 percent.  Two percent of the party’s voters came from 
those who voted for other parties in 1999, 7 percent from those who were eligible but 
chose not to vote in 1999, and 4 percent from those who were too young to vote in 1999.  
If we consider only those who have actually voted in 1999 and revealed their party 
choice, these figures imply that about one-fourth of the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) supporters came from the pro-Islamist party, one-fifth from the ultra-nationalist 
party, one-third from the two center-right parties, and one-fifth from one of the two 
center-left parties.  
 
 The proportion of the individuals in the sample who claim to have voted for the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) is higher than the 34.3 percent the party actually 
received in the 2002 election.  It appears that further political realignment has occurred 
after the election.  Some individuals who are sympathetic to the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) but voted for its close substitutes seem to have switched sides after 
witnessing its success, preferring to associate themselves with the victor.  The failure of 
the parties they voted for to even enter the parliament must have also played a role in 
causing them to reassess their allegiances.  A survey conducted about a month before the 
election by the same organization whose data we are using (SAM under the direction of 
Cenap Nurhat, 2002) gives the proportion of voters expressing a support for the Justice 
and Development Party (AKP) as 33.9 percent which is very close to the actual election 
outcome.  A more detailed comparison of our descriptive statistics with those of that 
survey and another one conducted only a week before the 3 November 2002 election by 
A&G Research Company, under the direction of Taha Erdem (2002a and 2002b), is 
given in Table 3.  The figures there indicate that only a modest amount of extra shift 
occurred after the election towards the Justice and Development Party (AKP) from the 
former Virtue Party (FP) voters.  It looks like those voters had largely made up their 
minds about supporting the Justice and Development Party (AKP) shortly after their 
former party was disbanded.  However, it appears that the proportions of voters who 
switched from the Democratic Left Party (DSP), the True Path Party (DYP) and the 
Motherland Party (ANAP), which were already high, have more than doubled during the 
couple of months following the election.  Those who converted from the Nationalist 
Action Party (MHP) have increased by almost 50 percent.  These increases are too high 
to attribute to sampling errors.   
 
 A survey conducted by Yılmaz Esmer (2002a and 2002b) immediately after the 
election can shed some light on the issue as well, although he reports only ballpark 
figures.  According to his findings almost all of those who supported the Virtue Party 
(FP) in 1999, about one-fourth of those who supported the Democratic Left Party (DSP) 
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in 1999, and more than one-fourth of those who voted for the Nationalist Action Party 
(MHP), the Motherland Party (ANAP), and the True Path Party (DYP), voted for the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002.  Another bit of evidence which supports 
the continuation of the vote shifts towards the Justice and Development Party (AKP), 
after the 2002 election, is the fact that the party was able to raise its vote share to 41.7 
percent in the 28 March 2004 local administrations (Provincial Councils) election.3  Also, 
the party’s 22 July 2007 parliamentary election vote was 46.6 percent.  In short, our 
findings should be interpreted as reflecting the situation about two months after the 2002 
election, incorporating the further realignment, rather than at the date of the election.   
 
 Some of the surveys mentioned above investigated also the socio-demographic 
characteristics of the 2002 voters.  While Erdem (2002b) found the supporters of the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) to be predominantly male, relatively older and less 
educated, as is the case in our sample, Esmer (2002a and 2002b) found them to be 
relatively less educated, but younger and with no gender bias.  On the other hand, a 
survey conducted during October 2002 by Yönelim Company, results of which are 
summarized in Turan (2004), found the Justice and Development Party (AKP) supporters 
to be predominantly male, relatively younger and with less schooling.4  Thus, there 
appears to be a consensus among various surveys that the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) supporters are relatively less educated, but no such agreement as to their age 
group or gender.  
 
 Comparing what our data suggests with those of macro studies is also in order.  
Akarca (2008), who investigates vote movements at the province level, through 
regression analysis, concludes that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has 
received almost all of the votes that went to the Virtue Party (FP) in 1999 and about half 
of the votes that went to the Nationalist Action, Motherland and True Path parties (MHP, 
ANAP and DYP).  These are quite consistent with the figures given in Table 1, related to 
the parties mentioned.  However, our data indicates that in addition, two-fifths of the 
Democratic Left Party (DSP) and almost one-fifth of the Republican People’s Party 
(CHP) votes were also captured by the Justice and Development Party (AKP).  The shift 
of votes from these two parties may have occurred during the post-election realignment 
process discussed above or may have re-shifted during that period. With regard to the 
remaining variables, Akarca also finds that the supporters of the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) are predominantly less-educated. 
 
 Finding the 1999 provincial vote shares of only Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and 
Virtue Party (FP) to be significantly correlated with the 2002 Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) votes, Tosun (2003) concludes that the latter has captured its votes mainly 
from the former two parties. On the other hand, the author interprets the near zero 
correlation estimate between various province-level socio-economic indicators and the 
2002 votes of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) as a sign that the party attracted 
votes from all segments of the society.  Finally, Tüzün (2002), who finds a high 
correlation between the 2002 Justice and Development Party (AKP) votes and the 
aggregate votes of the Virtue Party (FP), the Nationalistic Action Party (MHP), the True 
Path Party (DYP) and the Motherland party (ANAP), using district level data, concludes 
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that the former captured substantial amounts of votes from the latter four parties.  
However, he gives no breakdown of these votes.   
 
 
3. Regression results 
 
 Although the findings presented in the previous section paint a pretty good picture 
of the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP’s) success in attracting voters from most 
segments of the political spectrum, one needs to establish the statistical significance of 
these patterns and measure the influence of the variables under consideration on the 
likelihood of a voter casting his/her ballot for the Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
in a framework where all other factors are controlled for.  Besides determining the 
political parties from which the Justice and Development Party (AKP) supporters have 
originated, one could also investigate what types of voters were attracted from each party 
in particular.   Our aim in this section is to accomplish these two tasks. 
 
 Our methodology involves explaining the tendency of a voter to vote for the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002 using his/her party choice in the 1999 
election, his/her socio-demographic characteristics, ideological and religious leanings, 
and confidence in the future of the economy.  To accomplish this, we fitted logit 
regressions to the survey data described in the previous section.  To determine which 
segments of other parties Justice and Development Party (AKP) has attracted, we have 
also considered, as explanatory variables, the interactions between the political party 
choices in 1999 and the remaining variables.  We should note that this methodology is 
applicable to any data set, provided that it contains, besides voter characteristics, party 
choice information for two consecutive elections.  Thus, its application to similar 
situations in other countries can shed light on those as well.  In fitting our equations, we 
have employed an estimation option available in the software package STATA to 
compute robust standard errors, treating the data as a collection of clusters.  Observations 
within the clusters – which, in our case are the provinces - are allowed to be dependent 
while observations from different clusters are assumed to be independent.  For more 
detail on this procedure, the reader is referred to Rogers (1993). 
 
 In order to gauge the relative explanatory powers of the variables representing 
1999 party choices of voters and their various characteristics, we estimated two 
preliminary regressions which are presented in the first two columns of Table 4.  In the 
first regression, the tendency of a voter to cast his/her ballot for the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) in 2002 is explained only by his/her party choice in the 1999 
election.  According to coefficient estimates, a support for the Republican People’s Party 
(CHP) in 1999 appears to reduce the likelihood of voting for the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) in 2002, but a choice of one of the other parties in 1999 increases it.  A vote 
for the Virtue Party (FP) in 1999 increases the likelihood most, followed by a vote for the 
True Path Party (DYP), the Motherland Party (ANAP), the Nationalistic Action Party 
(MHP) and the Democratic Left Party (DSP), in that order.  The second regression links 
the probability of a voter voting for the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002 to 
his/her gender, age, years of schooling, place on the ideological spectrum, degree of 
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religiosity, and optimism about the future of the economy.  All of these factors, except 
gender, appear to provide significant information about the voter’s embrace or rejection 
of the Justice and Development Party (AKP).  Being older, further to the right, more 
religious, and more confident in the future of the economy, raises the chances of support 
for the party.  On the other hand, an increase in the years of schooling reduces it. With 
pseudo R-square values of 0.13 and 0.16, respectively, both equations seem to have a 
reasonable degree of explanatory power. The logical next step is to consider a 
specification which combines the two sets of variables. 
 
 In the third regression given in Table 4, the likelihood of voting for the Justice 
and Development party (AKP) in 2002 is expressed as a function of all the variables used 
in the first two regressions.  This renders the estimated coefficients of age and religiosity 
variables insignificant, in addition to the gender variable.  The party variable related to 
the 1999 vote for the Republican People’s Party (CHP) also becomes insignificant.  The 
coefficient estimate for the Democratic Left Party (DSP) variable increases, but those for 
other parties, decrease.  The drop in the coefficients of the Nationalist Action Party 
(MHP) and the True Path Party (DYP) are the most pronounced.  It should be noted that 
the addition of the variables in the second regression to the first alters the ranking of the 
parties in terms of the magnitudes of their coefficients.  This suggests that the voters 
drawn by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) from different parties have different 
characteristics.  
 
 Although the last specification estimated permits both sets of variables to have 
independent influences on the decision to vote for the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP), it is restrictive in the sense that it does not allow the impact of the Gender, Age, 
Schooling, Religiosity, Ideology and Economy variables to vary by the party voted for in 
1999.  However, given the sheer size of the vote movements and also that those parties 
have quite different constituencies, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is likely to 
have attracted different types of voters from each party.  Therefore, in the final step of 
our empirical work, we estimate a more comprehensive model which allows us to look 
into this possibility.  To be more specific, we estimate a model which includes the party 
dummies and their interactions with the remaining variables.  In fact, this model could be 
considered as an ‘unrestricted’ version of the earlier specification where each socio-
demographic variable is replaced by seven interaction terms.  Along with the six parties, 
the rest of the sample treated as a separate affiliation which, in turn, implies that instead 
of a single slope parameter, seven different slopes are estimated. 
 
 The estimates from the unrestricted model reported in Table 5 reveal that almost 
all of the Turkish voters had the economy on their minds when they entered the voting 
booth in 2002.   Its promise of a strong economy provided a near universal appeal for the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP).  All of the interaction terms involving the 
Economy variable are positive and significant, except the one for the Democratic Left 
Party (DSP).  This across-the-board confidence in the ability of the Justice and 
Development party (AKP) to reverse the misfortune of the economy probably had a lot to 
do with the successes of the municipal administrations under the mayors who joined the 
party after its formation. These were especially effective in providing services to the 
 9 
slum-dwellers living at the outskirts of the cities.  In fact, the leader of the party, Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan, developed his reputation after becoming the mayor of Istanbul in 1994.  
Furthermore, after having tried and lost faith in most of the parties, the Turkish electorate 
did not have too many choices left besides the newly formed Justice and Development 
Party (AKP).  Consequently, the party became the main beneficiary of “economic 
voting”.  Finally, the growing hope and anticipation in the build-up to the election that a 
single party government can be formed by the party, and its formation after the election, 
must also have led a substantial number of voters to coalesce around the party, following 
the dismal economic performances of various coalition governments over the past 
decade.   
 
 Moving on to the Ideology variable, the party appears also to have attracted 
especially the right-leaning voters of the Democratic Left Party (DSP), the Motherland 
Party (ANAP) and the Republican People’s Party (CHP).  The less educated voters of the 
Motherland Party (ANAP) and the Virtue Party (FP), older voters of the Nationalistic 
Action Party (MHP), and the female voters of the True Path Party (DYP), the Virtue 
Party (FP) and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) exhibit a greater tendency to switch to 
the Justice and Development Party (AKP).  Interestingly, religiosity was not a 
distinguishing feature of those who switched to the Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
from any of the other parties.  However, the presence of the Ideology and the Schooling 
variables acting as a proxy for religiosity may be partially responsible for this.  
 
 Expressed in another way, our findings imply that the segment of the Motherland 
Party (ANAP) voters the Justice and Development Party (AKP) was able to capture was 
predominantly less-educated, further to the right ideologically, and confident about the 
future of the economy under the latter party’s rule.  Those who switched from the 
Democratic Left Party (DSP) can be characterized as being more right-leaning, those 
from the True Path Party (DYP) as being disproportionately female and having an 
optimistic outlook on the future of the economy, and those from the Virtue Party (FP) as 
mainly being female, with less years of schooling, and high level of optimism concerning 
the future performance of the economy.  The females, the older, and the more optimistic 
individuals about the future of the economy dominate those who shifted from the 
Nationalistic Action Party (MHP).  The right-leaning and the optimistic about the future 
of the economy are predominant among those who made the switch from the Republican 
People’s Party and the remaining parties.  Given that there are no appropriate studies with 
which we can compare these findings, we believe that they provide our unique 
contribution to the understanding of the 2002 election outcome. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
 This paper was motivated mainly by the fact that more than half of the votes moved 
from one party to another between the 1999 and 2002 elections in Turkey.  None of the 
parties which entered the parliament after the 1999 election were able to do so in 2002.  
The lion’s share of the votes lost by these parties went to the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP).  The micro data analyzed here provides evidence that further vote switches 
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occurred immediately after the election.  It appears that in the less than eighteen months 
between its formation and the time our data was collected, the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) captured almost all of the former Virtue Party (FP) votes, about half of the 
former Motherland Party (ANAP), True Path Party (DYP) and Nationalistic Action Party 
(MHP) votes, two-fifths of the former Democratic Left Party (DSP) votes, and about one-
fifth of the votes of the former Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the remaining 
parties. 
 
 Our econometric findings suggest that a strong belief on the part of the electorate 
that a good economic performance can be achieved through a single-party government 
formed by the party was a leading factor in the success of the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP).  It appears that at a time when voters were outraged by inter-party 
squabbling, corruption allegations and the poor economic performance under various 
coalitions formed by the other parties, its promise of an effective and stable single-party 
government and disavowal of political Islam, led voters from various parts of the political 
spectrum and various segments of the society to coalesce around the Justice and 
Development party (AKP).  We also found that for the voters coming from the left-of-
center Democratic Left Party (DSP) and the Republican People’s Party (CHP), and the 
right-of-center Motherland Party (ANAP), ideological factors played an important role, 
besides the economy, whereas in the case of voters transferred from the right-of-center 
True Path Party (DYP), pro-Islamist Virtue Party (FP) and ultra-nationalist Nationalist 
Action Party (MHP), it was the demographic factors.  It appears that the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) was more appealing to the less-ideological center-right swing 
voters, some of whom had switched to the center-left parties in the previous election, than 
to the hard core right-wing voters who remained loyal to their parties.  The more 
pragmatic and less ideological discourse of party leader Erdoğan, no doubt played an 
important role in this 
 
  Following a spectacular election victory in 2002, the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) managed to raise its vote share further after ruling one legislative term.  A 
commonly-shared view is that this had much to do with favorable global economic 
conditions and the government’s seemingly-sincere efforts in making progress on 
Turkey’s accession to the European Union.  It would be interesting and useful to find out 
to what extent the party’s success was the result of further political realignment in 
response to the party’s liberal policies and to what extent it was a consequence of good 
economic performance.  An empirical analysis of more recent data, similar to the one 
performed here could provide us with valuable insights in this regard.   
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 Table 1 
Movement of voters from other parties to Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
Between 1999 and 2002 according to the working sample a   
 
 
 
         
Parties voted for in 
the 1999 election 
 
                                                  
                                                         
Frequency 
                             
Proportion voted for the 
Justice and Development Party  
(AKP) in 2002  
(%) 
 
 
 
Motherland Party 
(ANAP)                   
 
 124 
 
58.1 
 
 
Republican People’s Party 
(CHP) 
 
 121 
 
15.7 
 
 
Democratic Left Party  
(DSP) 
  
 166 
 
 
41.0 
 
 
True Path Party    
(DYP) 
 
 113 
 
54.9 
 
Virtue Party 
(FP) 
 
 126 
 
87.3 
 
Nationalist Action Party 
(MHP) 
 
 179 
 
53.6 
 
 
Other Parties 
 
 
  38 
 
21.1 
 
 
Did not vote 
  
 
 113 
 
32.7 
 
 
Was to young to vote 
 
 
   88 
 
26.1 
 
 
No answer 
 
 
  75 
 
33.3 
 
 
Total 
 
 
1143 
 
45.5 
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Table 1 notes: 
a/ In paranthesis are the Turkish acronyms of political parties.  The Democratic Left Party  
   (DSP), the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and the Motherland Party (ANAP) were the  
    incumbents in 2002. 
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Table 2 
Sample and subsample means of the explanatory variables a   
 
 
 
         
Variables 
 
                     
                                          
Sample  
                                                                             
Subsample 1 
(AKP02=1) 
 
Subsample 2 
(AKP02=0) 
 
 
ANAP99                   
 
0.11 
 
0.14 
 
0.08 
 
 
CHP99 
 
0.11 
 
0.04 
 
0.16 
 
 
DSP99 
 
0.15 
 
0.13 
 
0.16 
 
 
DYP99 
 
0.10 
 
0.12 
 
0.08 
 
FP99 
 
0.11 
 
0.21 
 
0.03 
 
MHP99 
 
0.16 
 
0.18 
 
0.13 
 
 
OTHER99 
 
0.03 
 
0.02 
 
0.05 
 
 
NOVOTE99  
 
0.10 
 
0.07 
 
0.12 
 
 
YOUNG99 
 
0.08 
 
0.04 
 
0.10 
 
 
NOANS99 
 
~0.00 
 
~0.00 
 
~0.00 
 
 
GENDER 
 
0.48 
 
0.50 
 
0.46 
 
 
AGE 
 
37.7 
 
39.2 
 
36.5 
 
SCHOOLING 
 
7.48 
 
6.74 
 
8.10 
 
IDEOLOGY 
 
3.46 
 
3.96 
 
3.04 
 
 
RELIGIOSITY 
 
3.87 
 
4.02 
 
3.74 
 
 
ECONOMY 
 
3.39 
 
3.64 
 
3.17 
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Table 2 notes: 
a/ ANAP99, CHP99, DSP99, DYP99, FP99, MHP99 and OTHER99 equal to one if the  
    respondent voted in 1999 for the Motherland Party (ANAP), the Republican People’s Party  
    (CHP), the Democratic Left Party (DSP), the True Path Party (DYP), the Virtue Party   
    (FP), the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and another party, respectively, and zero  
    otherwise.  NOVOTE99, YOUNG99 and NOANS99 are equal to one if, in 1999, the  
    respondent, did not vote,  was too young to vote, and did not reveal his/her vote,  
    respectively, and zero otherwise.  GENDER equals one in the case of a female respondent  
    and zero in case of a male respondent.  AGE refers to the age of the respondent in years.   
    SCHOOLING variable is equal to 18 if the respondent’s highest degree is a Ph.D., M.S.,  
    or M.A., 15 if it is a B.S. or B.A., 11 if it is a high school diploma, 8 if it is a middle school   
    diploma and 5 if it is a primary school diploma.  For illiterates, SCHOOLING takes on the  
    value of zero, and for literate people with no diploma it is taken as 2.  IDEOLOGY  
    variable equals to 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5, depending upon whether the respondent placed himself  
    or herself on the ideological spectrum at the left, center-left, center, center-right, or right,  
    respectively.  RELIGIOSITY variable ranges from 1 to 5, with 5 signifying that the  
    respondent is highly religious and, 1 signifying that he/she is not religious at all.   
    ECONOMY measures the level of optimism or pessimism of the respondent about the  
    economic conditions during the next 12 months.  It ranges from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating a  
    very bleak view of the economy and 5 a very bright outlook.         
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 Table 3 
Movement of voters from other parties to Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
Between 1999 and 2002 according to various surveys a   
 
 
 
S u r v e y s 
 
 
         
 
 
 
Parties voted for in 
the 1999 election 
 
 
SAM 
Nuhrat  
(Sep. 28 – Oct. 1, 2002) 
(%) 
 
 
A&G 
Erdem  
(Oct. 26-27, 2002) 
(%) 
 
SAM 
Nuhrat 
(Dec. 21-27, 2002) 
(%) 
 
 
Motherland Party 
(ANAP) 
                   
 
 
28.5 
 
 
28.7 
 
 
58.1 
 
 
Republican People’s Party 
(CHP) 
 
 
 
5.1 
 
 
3.0 
 
 
15.7 
 
 
Democratic Left Party  
(DSP) 
 
 
 
15.8 
 
 
14.1 
 
 
41.0 
 
 
True Path Party    
(DYP) 
 
 
 
25.2 
 
 
21.5 
 
 
54.9 
 
Virtue Party 
(FP) 
 
 
 
81.8 
 
 
69.1 
 
 
87.3 
 
Nationalist Action Party 
(MHP) 
 
 
 
36.3 
 
 
 
38.1 
 
 
53.6 
 
 
Not voted in 1999 
 
 
 
28.2 
 
 
26.9 
 
 
32.7 
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Table 4  
Logit regressions:   
The determinants of tendency to vote for AKP in 2002 a 
 
Variables 
 
(1) 
 
(2) (3) 
1.271  0.972 ANAP99 (0.000)  (0.000) 
-0.729  -0.354 CHP99 (0.018)  (0.248) 
0.569  0.638 DSP99 (0.001)  (0.001) 
1.141  0.598 DYP99 (0.000)  (0.009) 
2.792  2.274 FP99 (0.000)  (0.000) 
1.015  0.616 MHP99 (0.000)  (0.003) 
 0.250 0.303 GENDER 
 (0.183) (0.130) 
 0.016 0.010 AGE 
 (0.007) (0.130) 
             -0.064 -0.051 SCHOOLING 
 (0.002) (0.007) 
 0.633 0.528 IDEOLOGY 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
 0.243 0.121 RELIGIOSITY 
 (0.055) (0.339) 
 0.492 0.479 ECONOMY 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
-0.902 -5.287 -4.848 Constant (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Pseudo R-square 
 
0.1254 
 
0.1607 
 
 
0.2139 
 
Table 4 notes: 
a/ For definitions of variables see Table 2 notes.  The dependent variable in each regression is  
    AKP02. The numbers in parantheses are the probability values of two-sided tests   
    of significance.  Shaded cells indicate significance at the 10% level.  The number  
    of observations used in the estimation of the regressions is 1080. 
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Table 5   
Logit regressions with interaction terms:  
The determinants of tendency to vote for AKP in 2002 a 
 
 Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value 
ANAP99 1.911 0.442     
CHP99 0.466 0.870     
DSP99 3.379 0.161     
DYP99 4.162 0.290     
FP99 7.278 0.091     
MHP99 1.048 0.717     
Constant -6.261 0.000     
 × GENDER   × IDEOLOGY 
ANAP99 0.066 0.861  ANAP99 0.684 0.001 
CHP99 0.081 0.894  CHP99 0.615 0.006 
DSP99 0.267 0.510  DSP99 0.907 0.000 
DYP99 0.761 0.040  DYP99 0.123 0.641 
FP99 1.390 0.057  FP99 0.343 0.346 
MHP99 1.014 0.023  MHP99 0.237 0.130 
Rest of sample -0.272 0.496  Rest of sample 0.633 0.000 
 × AGE   × RELIGIOSITY 
ANAP99 -0.022 0.343  ANAP99 0.453 0.187 
CHP99 -0.014 0.322  CHP99 0.660 0.200 
DSP99 0.014 0.416  DSP99 -0.295 0.292 
DYP99 0.027 0.273  DYP99 -0.417 0.309 
FP99 -0.030 0.230  FP99 0.043 0.942 
MHP99 0.044 0.008  MHP99 0.158 0.615 
Rest of sample 0.009 0.446  Rest of sample 0.300 0.102 
 × SCHOOLING   × ECONOMY 
ANAP99 -0.522 0.010  ANAP99 0.920 0.006 
CHP99 -0.217 0.399  CHP99 0.435 0.041 
DSP99 -0.130 0.552  DSP99 0.229 0.270 
DYP99 -0.039 0.884  DYP99 0.571 0.038 
FP99 -0.715 0.009  FP99 0.781 0.024 
MHP99 0.171 0.357  MHP99 0.315 0.018 
Rest of sample -0.070 0.442  Rest of sample 0.613 0.005 
 
Table 5 notes: 
a/ For definitions of variables see table 2 notes.  The dependent variable of the regression is  
    AKP02.  Shaded cells indicate significance at the 10% level.  The number of      
    observations used in the estimation of the regression is 1080.  Pseudo R-square is  
    0.2491. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1
  Although, the AKP is nowadays perceived more as a center-right party, it narrowly escaped being closed  
   down in the summer of 2008. On March 14, 2008 the Chief Prosecutor of the Turkish Constitutional  
   Court charged the Justice and  Development Party (AKP) with the same offenses as its predecessor, the  
   Virtue Party (FP).  The Constitutional Court found the party guilty on July 30, 2008 but decided against  
   its closure.  Instead, the court imposed a financial penalty on the party and warned it that similar actions  
   in the future may result in its dissolution.     
 
2
 The vote share of the Kurdish-nationalist Democratic People’s Party (DEHAP) was 22 percent in these  
   two provinces as opposed to only 2 percent in the remaining 23 provinces in the sample. 
 
3
 Akarca and Tansel (2006) estimate that in a local or by election the major incumbent party typically  
   receives 6 percent less of the vote relative to a parliamentary election held under similar economic and  
   incumbency conditions.  Therefore, it can be argued that, this vote share is comparable to a vote share of  
   about 48 percent in a parliamentary general election. 
  
4
 The latter survey did not investigate the issue of inter-party vote movements.    
 
